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The application of economic theory and principles to firms' human resource problems is 
commonplace today. Personnel economics has come a long way since its early days in the late 
1970s and 1980s, when scholars developed its theoretical foundations. In this contribution and 
introduction to the special issue “Advances in Personnel Economics” of the German Journal of 
Human Resource Management, we want to illustrate the origins of the field, outline how 
personnel economics relates to other research areas, describe major developments in the field 
and address its future challenges. 
 
 
The Origins of Personnel Economics 
 
Arguably, the field dates back to Adam Smith who in 1776 in The Wealth of Nations pointed 
out a possible trade-off between wages of employees and non-monetary working conditions 
within a labor market equilibrium (Smith 1976). Trade-offs and an equilibrium-based analysis 
are also important features of modern theoretical approaches in Personnel economics. 
Employees choose jobs taking into account a variety of job characteristics, including initial 
compensation, training and information that workers receive on the job. They trade better 
attributes off against the higher effort that more rewarding jobs require. Firms decide whether 
to implement (costly) human resources (HR) practices in order to attract, motivate, and retain 
employees. In so doing, firms attempt to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. 
These considerations affect the choice of recruiting channels and worker selection procedures, 
which match employees to jobs with specific characteristics. Additionally, the provision of 
incentives, the structure of monetary and non-monetary rewards, including career-based 
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incentives, performance evaluation, team creation and job design are all part of personnel 
economics as it attempts to understand the complex aspects of internal labor markets (see 
Doeringer & Piore 1971). Indeed, there is early precedent for these issues being considered as 
important in labor markets. Slichter (1920, 1928) was one of the first economists to explore 
internal decision making of firms and to contrast that with outcomes of anonymous markets.  
 
 
Personnel Economics and Related Fields 
 
Personnel economics is related to other research fields (see Figure 1). The origins of the field 
of personnel economics are in labor economics. In his Presidential Address to the Society of 
Labor Economists in 1998, Lazear described Personnel Economics as a branch of labor 
economics distinctive for its "use of economics to understand the internal workings of the firm" 
(Lazear, 1999: 200). Whereas most of research in labor economics explores efficiency of labor 
markets at a higher level of aggregation, personnel economics examines welfare within an 
employment relationship and focuses on interactions between employees and firms, managers 
and subordinates, or among colleagues (Lazear & Oyer 2013). As compared to traditional 
human resources management (HRM), personnel economics is characterized by applying three 
core principles of economics. First, personnel economics focuses on firms and workers as 
rational maximising agents, continually interacting with one another within and beyond the 
firm. Indeed, it has been argued that "the success of personnel economics is in large part a result 
of simply assuming maximisation because doing so allows the analyst to express complicated 
concepts in relatively simple, albeit abstract, terms" (Lazear, 2000: F612). Second, it operates 
in a framework informed by the concept of equilibrium. Third, because personnel economics is 
economics in the most standard sense, it allows for welfare comparisons. In the purest cases, 
competitive equilibrium results in efficiency, and so in personnel economics, the attempt by 
workers to maximise utility, coupled with the firms’ efforts to maximize profits results in 
positive welfare outcomes (Lazear & Shaw 2007). For some years now, personnel economics 
has also incorporated non-standard preferences, which is the subject of much of behavioral 
economics. For example, personnel economists now consider extensions of the individuals’ 
utility function where the assumption of a purely egoistic homo oeconomicus is replaced by an 
alternative, but still maximizing view of homo reciprocans (see, for example Backes-Gellner 
et al. 2008, Dohmen et al. 2009and Dohmen (2014). This work extends personnel economics 
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to consider intrinsic motivation and fairness considerations, social preferences for equity or 
equality and gender differences in decisions and behavior. 
 
 
Figure 1: Personnel Economics and Related Fields 
 
Personnel Economics is also related to Industrial Relations (when considering the role of works 
councils, unions and other labor market institutions – see Kaufmann (2010)), Industrial 
Organization (when considering interdependencies between and competition among firms and 
HR issues) and Organizational Behavior (when considering attitudes and behavior of 
employees).  
 
 
Development of Personnel Economics over 30 years 
 
Personnel economics first came to prominence in 1987 when the Journal of Labor Economics 
published a special supplement entitled "The New Economics of Personnel" containing 10 
articles. Personnel economics started as a mainly theoretical field, but became more empirical 
in the 1990s (Lazear 1999). Since then researchers have increasingly made use of new data and 
have exploited a large number of firm-based data sets. These case studies do not qualitatively 
describe the situation of a firm, but rather analyze personnel records or other HR data 
quantitatively using sophisticated econometric techniques. This approach, known as insider 
econometrics, involves "empirical studies of how management matters" (Ichniowski & Shaw 
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2009). Scholars are also using country-wide linked employer-employee data sets to explore 
more general relationships than the firm-based data are capable of doing. The “administrative” 
datasets have allowed a larger set of questions to be analyzed because the worker can be 
examined in the context of the entire firm, its growth rates, its other employees, its management 
and how variations in these factors affect outcomes. The data also permit researchers to study 
how the characteristics of workers affect the performance of the firm and to do so in a more 
general fashion than the firm based datasets.   
 
Nonetheless, a certain degree of endogeneity usually remains and personnel economics is 
particularly attentive to addressing causal identification. Lab experiments were among the first 
methods used to explore treatment effects in a controlled setting with the aim of identifying 
clean causal relations. Currently, more and more field experiments are being performed in an 
attempt to overcome the limitations of lab experiments, particularly external validity. Field 
experiments create exogenous variation by randomizing employees or teams of employees into 
different HR treatments. Typically, a research question is posed first and then an experiment is 
designed that can create exogenous variation of the sort that answers the question. There is 
feedback: Empirical insights have suggested enhancements to theory, for example by revealing 
the importance of social preferences or norms that were originally neglected. 
 
 
Future Challenges for Personnel Economics 
 
The future of Personnel Economics is not without challenges. The growing number of scholars 
entering the field together with the increase in topics covered make it increasingly difficult to 
define the boundaries of the field. On the one hand, that is a strength.  The prevalence of more 
researchers, more questions and more findings is symptomatic of a rich scholarly discipline. 
Still, the field will not preserve its own identity automatically. The discipline seems to have no 
problems attracting young scholars and PhDs in economics departments, business schools and, 
indeed, in social science more widely. Besides, the identity of the field is not a value per se. A 
possible problem in unambiguously classifying certain contributions according to research 
areas is secondary to progress of knowledge and advancement of science. Until recently, certain 
HR relevant topics have been discussed in the rather separate spheres of the economics and 
management literatures. Perhaps personnel economists will help to bridge these gaps. 
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In which directions will personnel economics go in the future? It has already been suggested 
that there is scope for additional research on hiring, sorting and selection (Lazear & Oyer 2013). 
There are at least four additional promising directions: 
 
First, it is important to consolidate knowledge to encourage useful validation while avoiding 
unnecessary duplication. Part of the difficulty lies in the nature of knowledge production. A 
particular study may add only incrementally or not at all to the sum total of what we know about 
causal relations. This problem is not unique to personnel economics. For instance, it is often 
difficult to discern the state of the art in welfare-to-work evaluations when findings appear so 
context-specific and are not readily related to the existing body of knowledge. One particularly 
valuable way to assist with consolidation is to foster replication - replication using the same 
data but potentially different analytical techniques - but also replication across time and place 
to test the external validity of findings. Several very basic issues in personnel economics have 
been explored in only a handful of studies. Take, for instance, the longer-run effects of pay-for-
performance. Lazear (2000b) is one of the few studies that examine the effects of pay-for-
performance beyond the typical short timeframe of a few hours to a couple of weeks. It is also 
important to collect evidence from a much broader set of occupations and sectors for a variety 
of topics than people in the field have currently done, and to consider broader international 
evidence.  
 
Second, Personnel economics (and perhaps the firms themselves) would benefit from more field 
experiments. Although randomisation is by no means a solution to all evaluation problems 
(Deaton & Cartwright 2016) it does provide opportunities to understand causal relationships 
inside the firm. Firms are often resistant to engaging in experimentation, for fear that changes 
may have long-lasting and adverse consequences for profit. Personnel economists must address 
the question of how we persuade firms to take evaluation seriously when they decide whether 
to adopt or discontinue a policy.  
 
Third, it seems worthwhile to explore in more detail, in what way and why HR policies differ 
within and between firms. Possible characteristics of differentiation within the firm are attitudes 
of employees, but also the business units’, functional areas’ culture or differences between 
hierarchical levels. Additionally, there may be a number of equivalent or nearly-equivalent 
approaches to maximizing profits and this may help explain why firms choose different 
practices. To the extent that this interacts with other agents or firms and yields multiple 
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equilibria, it might be useful to consider the role of the firm in networks and the competitive 
situation more intensively.  
 
Fourth, how do we "scale up" from the micro to the macro? Here one needs to move beyond 
the transactions between firm and workers and consider the institutions beyond the firm - the 
state, industry confederations, trade unions - and the role they play, for instance, in the costs 
and benefits of human resource management practice adoption. 
 
 
This Special Issue 
 
Further evidence that personnel economics is thriving comes with the four papers presented in 
this Special Issue. All four papers use field data, but cover a wide variety of topics.  
 
The paper by Samuel Mühlemann, Harald Pfeifer and Felix Wenzelmann is the first in the 
literature to estimate the costs of recruiting apprentices. The authors use German establishment 
data and the paper provides a good example of a personnel economics study that has both a 
practical focus and yet maps out general empirical regularities.  The authors are able to 
determine the cost of selecting and employing apprentices, to identify the factors that explain 
heterogeneity in those costs across firms, to understand the role of works councils, and to do by 
by relying on competition for recruits across firms. The study's timing is particularly prescient 
from both the a firm and a policy perspective given the sizeable changes that are taking place 
in the German labor market as the native youth population declines and the migrant labor force 
increases. 
 
Anders Frederiksen studies job satisfaction and employee turnover. He describes a mechanism 
for using personnel data and information from anonymous job satisfaction surveys to predict 
employee quits. Anonymity is essential to avoid responses that are strategic. Frederiksen 
illustrates this rationale in a simple example of a cooperation game with a prisoner’s dilemma 
situation. He argues that an effective way to overcome the cooperation problem may be to 
delegate the implementation of job satisfaction surveys to a third party. His empirical study is 
based on company data from 2004 and 2010 with about 90,000 observations over 18,000 
individuals. Frederiksen is able to show that reliable job satisfaction information from an 
external consulting firm is useful in predicting employee turnover. This contribution documents 
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in a very convincing way how theoretical considerations in personnel economics together with 
a careful empirical analysis can help to improve real world decision making in firms. 
 
The paper by Tom McKenzie and Alasdair Rutherford on career concerns and shared values, 
which builds on the theoretical work by Holmström (1982, 1999), is the first in the literature to 
investigate empirically how employees’ motivation stemming from career concerns interacts 
with motivation from sharing the values of their employer. It is a nice example of how recent 
research in behavioral and experimental economics can inspire a fresh look at matched 
employer-employee data. The authors use overtime work as a proxy for and exploit a question 
on shared values with the employer in the UK Workplace Employment Relations Survey. In 
line with the prediction by standard theory that career concerns incentives are strongest at the 
start of an employee’s career, the authors find that employees work less overtime the longer 
their tenure. Employees who agree with the statement that they share many of the values of 
their employer put in about 20 percent more overtime work than those who do not agree. The 
novel finding of the study is that shared values appear to make career concerns less relevant. 
Overtime declines with tenure for employees who do not strongly share the values of their 
employer, but do not decline with tenure for employees with shared values.  
 
Last, Andrew Seltzer presents an insightful analysis of implicit contracts and acquisitions. His 
work builds on data from a historical case study, namely, the hostile takeover of the Bank of 
South Australia in 1892 by the Union Bank of Australia during the first great wave of mergers. 
Seltzer uses data from personnel records, which detail complete career histories of workers in 
both companies before and after the merger. He investigates the conjecture that shareholders 
may benefit from a hostile takeover as money is redistributed from workers to the shareholders. 
Seltzer finds that the lifetime earnings of older workers at the Bank of South Australia declined 
as a result of the merger and, moreover, that they had a higher probability of losing their jobs, 
that specific human capital was lost because some branches were closed, that the wage profile 
was flatter for the remaining career and that the pension was reduced. One interpretation of the 
results is that the Union Bank of Australia renegotiated potential implicit contracts with former 
employees of the Bank of South Australia after the merger. Seltzer’s study is an excellent 
example of an econometric study of a data set with detailed information on individual 
employees analyzing some fundamental ideas from Lazear’s earlier work. 
 
  
8 
 
References 
Backes-Gellner, U.; Bessey, D.; Pull, K.; Tuor, S. (2008): What Behavioural Economics 
Teaches Personnel Economics. Die Unternehmung 62, 217-234. 
Deaton, A.; Cartwright, N. (2016): Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized 
Controlled Trials. NBER Working Paper No. 22595. 
Doeringer, P.; Piore, M. (1971): Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis. Lexington: 
Lexington Books 
Dohmen, T. (2014): Behavioral Labor Economics: Advances and Future Directions, Labour 
Economics, 30, 71–85. 
Dohmen, T.; Falk, A.; Huffman, D.; Sunde, U. (2009): Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence 
on Behavioural Outcomes. The Economic Journal 119, 592-612. 
Holmström, B. (1982): Managerial Incentive Problems – A Dynamic Perspective. In: 
Walross, B. (ed.): Essays in Economics and Management in Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, 
Helsinki, 209-230. 
Holmström, B. (1999): Managerial Incentive Problems – A Dynamic Perspective. Review of 
Economic Studies 66, 169-182. 
Ichniowski, C.; Shaw, K. (2013): Insider Econometrics: Empirical Studies of How 
Management Matters. In: Gibbons, R.; Roberts, J. (eds): Handbook of Organizational 
Economics. Princeton University Press, 263-311. 
Kaufman, B.E. (2010): The Theoretical Foundation of Industrial Relations and its 
Implications for Labor Economics and Human Resource Management. Industrial & 
Labor Relations Review 64, 74-108. 
Lazear, E. P. (1999): Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions. Journal of 
Labor Economics 17, 199-236. 
Lazear, E. P. (2000a): The Future of Personnel Economics. The Economic Journal 110, F611-
F639. 
Lazear, E.P. (2000b): Performance Pay and Productivity, American Economic Review 90, 
1346-1361. 
Lazear, E. P.; Shaw, K. L. (2007): Personnel Economics: The Economists’s View of Human 
Resources. Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 91-114. 
Lazear, E. P; Oyer, P. (2013): Personnel Economics. In: Gibbons, R.; Roberts, J. (eds): 
Handbook of Organizational Economics. Princeton University Press, 479-519. 
Slichter, S. (1920): Industrial Morale. Quarterly Journal of Economics 35, 36–60. 
Slichter, S. (1928): Modern Economic Theory, New York: Henry Holt. 
Smith, Adam (1976): An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
München (reproduction of original of 1776). 
